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THE LAND USE - ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
DISTINCTION: A GEO-FEMINIST CRITIQUE
NANCY PERKINS SPYKE*
The ability of thought to transcend the circumstances in which it
finds itself, its urge to create “other worlds,” is surely one source of
our present environmental problems. It is also the wellspring of a
1
hope that we might overcome such problems.

To the vast majority of lawyers the areas of land use planning
and environmental regulation are distinct. The subjects are treated in
separate courses in law schools, zoning ordinances differ from environmental laws, and professionals are identified as land use planners
or environmental consultants. The distinction between land use and
environmental regulation is also relevant in case law. It can be crucial
in preemption cases and can also arise in sovereign immunity, intervention and standing disputes. Additionally, the distinction has surfaced in Chevron determinations and, in a subtle yet important way, it
plays a role in regulatory takings cases.
Yet the persistent application of the distinction is both artificial
and antiquated, impeding efforts to improve ecological well-being.
History admittedly offers a partial explanation for the distinction, but
that alone provides scant reason to accept it with a precedential nod.
This is especially true today, when the dichotomy is being questioned
and blurred in numerous ways. Instead, what is called for is a
searching and critical examination.
Undoubtedly, there are many ways to analyze the distinction between land use and environmental regulation. Critiques based on
feminism and geography offer two meaningful approaches. A feminist critique suggests that the distinction is an outgrowth of the malefemale dualism that plagues western thought. Once characterized in
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1. MICK SMITH, AN ETHICS OF PLACE: RADICAL ECOLOGY, POSTMODERNITY AND
SOCIAL THEORY 1 (2001).
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this manner, the dichotomy can be shown to result in abstraction,
homogenization and the domination of nature. To the extent the distinction severs decision-making from local ecological conditions, it
can also be criticized from a geographic perspective. A geographic
critique is also useful since the distinction often severs decisionmaking processes from local ecological conditions that are experienced by nearby residents. A geo-feminist critique integrates these
two arguments into a more comprehensive attack against the abstract
dualism that troubles the distinction.
Eliminating the distinction will not leave judges, legislators, environmental attorneys and land use planners adrift. Instead, their decision-making can be enlightened by an awareness that land use choices
inevitably impact the environment and that significant local input ensures that environmentally sustainable choices are made. A decisionmaking paradigm based on sustainable environmental planning in the
context of a particular land use scheme would merge issues traditionally associated with land use and environmental regulation and would
respond favorably to the geo-feminist critique of the status quo.
This thesis could certainly be labeled radical, and as such is one
2
that critics may summarily dismiss. However, this article’s critique is
only one of many ways to challenge a distinction that is already dissolving. The geo-feminist critique raises property rights concerns as
well, and for that reason a strong thread of property theory is woven
throughout this article. Ultimately, the contextualized, integrative alternative approach to land use and environmental regulation which is
suggested here reflects a new social construct of property rights—one
that goes beyond the “background principles” test of Lucas.3
The history that gave rise to the land use planning-environmental
regulation distinction (which from this point forward will be referred
to as the land use-enviro distinction) and relevant case law are reviewed in the first two parts of this article. A discussion of various
trends and non-feminist, non-geographic critiques that anticipate the
distinction’s demise follows. The next three sections of the article explore feminist, geographical, and geo-feminist analyses as viable critiques of the distinction. Finally, the article promotes contextualized

2. See Keith Hirokawa, Some Pragmatic Observtions about Radical Critique in Environmental Law, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 225, 227, 236-39 (2001) (describing ecofeminism as a radical
perspective).
3. See Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); infra text accompanying notes
122–26.
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sustainable planning as a viable alternative and considers its impact
on the type of cases that have traditionally relied on the distinction.
I. HISTORY
The land use-enviro dichotomy is largely an outgrowth of history.
The two fields developed separately, each enjoying a heyday during
different decades of the twentieth century. They also evolved as abstract areas of law in the sense that their foundations were largely disconnected from land-related concerns. While it is true that environmental regulation targets problems with natural resources and is
arguably concerned with the land to some degree, its history has
been focused predominantly on social policies rather than the land itself. While it is true that the complexity of land use and environmental regulation has grown over the years, and that overlap between
them is becoming more common, nevertheless land use and environmental law remain distinct.
One common ground between land use and environmental
regulation is their entanglement with property law. This is not surprising given the dominance of property rights issues in land use and
4
environmental decision-making. Not only is legislation routinely
crafted with property rights in mind, but charges of regulatory takings
5
are often leveled against zoning ordinances and environmental laws.
Although it is not the purpose of this article to provide an exhaustive
analysis of the property-environment debate, a few remarks regarding
the history of property rights will provide a helpful context for the
balance of this historical survey.
Property law, of course, pre-dates land use and environmental
6
regulation, which are themselves “as old as the hills.” The history
relevant to this article, however, begins in the nineteenth century. By
that time the natural law conception of property had been discarded
in favor of a socially constructed model, built upon the idea that

4. See Hirokawa, supra note 2, at 233 (“[A]lthough the property right is likely not a fundamental principle supporting environmental law, environmental law nonetheless operates in
the context of, and subject to, the pervasiveness of the property paradigm.”).
5. Two recent examples are Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates, Ltd. P’ship, 71
S.W. 3d 18 (Tex. App. 2002) (successful challenge brought against a plat approval law) and
Gazza v. N. Y. Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 679 N.E. 2d 1035 (N.Y. 1997) (building variance
denial due to wetlands regulation held not a taking).
6. Marc R. Poirier, Property, Environment, Community, 12 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 43, 59
(1997).
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property rights exist to serve social goals.7 The Enlightenment had
much to do with this view of property. Beginning in the seventeenth
century, philosophers focused on humans rather than nature; a disdain for religion led to confidence in the triumph of human reason,
science and technology.8 Intellectual freedom, toleration, equality
and community were viewed as necessary for society’s progression.
These ideals eventually led to the rise of capitalism and the marketplace, where the autonomous individual reigned.9 In time, the Enlightenment practice of scientific inquiry was applied to law;10 concepts such as freedom of contract emerged, transforming private
11
property rights.
The policies initially advanced by the law of property included
the promotion of economic growth and the protection of investments
12
and privacy. Those objectives have not remained fixed, however.
Over time, advances in science, technology and moral attitudes have
13
led to changes in property norms. The evolution has been slow, a
product of deliberate negotiation at various institutional levels, yet
change has occurred.14 In the process, property law has become more
15
intricate and socially responsive than ever.
Land use statutes grew out of the common law’s limits on prop16
erty, most notably the restrictions imposed by nuisance law. Zoning
7. Eric T. Freyfogle, The Particulars of Owning, 25 ECOLOGY L. Q. 574, 575-76 (1999) . In
contrast, Thomas Hobbes, writing during the seventeenth century, focused on natural law, and
observed that the ordered operation of a state depended on “a rational system of rules derived
by the application of logic and deductive syllogistic reasoning to a set of definitions, names, and
meanings derived from experience.” CAROLYN MERCHANT, THE DEATH OF NATURE 213–14
(1980).
8. David M. Warner, Time for a New Enlightenment, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 455, 460 (1997).
9. See Id. at 474. Professor Warner argues that the vestiges of the Enlightenment have left
us with an amoral world of science and self-gratification. Id. at 475–76. The rise of preindustrial capitalism in England occurred during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, at a time when the patriarchal family was an important social institution. MERCHANT, supra note 7, at 173–78. It was the age of Francis Bacon, who championed the scientific method
and the idea of man’s conquest of nature. Id. at 169–72. “The Baconian program, so important
to the rise of Western science, contained within it a set of attitudes about nature and the scientist that reinforced the tendencies toward growth and progress inherent in early capitalism.” Id.
at 185.
10. Warner, supra note 8, at 473.
11. Id. at 475.
12. See Freyfogle, supra note 7, at 583.
13. Poirier, supra note 6, at 48; Freyfogle, supra note 7, at 577-78.
14. Poirier, supra note 6, at 48.
15. See Freyfogle, supra note 7, at 578.
16. Robert H. Cutting, “One Man’s Ceilin’ is Another Man’s Floor”: Property Rights as the
Double-Edged Sword, 31 ENVTL. L. 8, 861 (2001).
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laws—the original land use statutes—represented the first legislative
17
efforts targeting externalities. Beginning in the early twentieth century, Euclidian-style ordinances were enacted by local governments
with state authorization. Today, the vast majority of land use lawmaking continues to be accomplished at the local level with state support.18
As it is traditionally described, the history of land use reflects a
move away from a decentralized system, which allowed private landowners to make their own land use decisions, to one that is increas19
ingly regulated and centralized. By 1930’s, land use laws were ubiquitous. These early zoning efforts effectively codified nuisance law.20
Provisions that segregated land uses, restricted building heights, and
21
mandated setbacks were common. Incompatible land uses were the
main focus of these ordinances, but noise and odors were also targeted. As the twentieth century progressed, land use regulations targeted broader interests, including the protection of property values,
population control,22 and historic preservation.23 Aesthetic zoning has
also become popular, as have ordinances that address environmental
24
concerns. Today’s land use regulation has, in many ways, moved
well beyond nuisance prevention and increasingly strives to protect
public amenities.25 In the process, private land ownership has taken
26
on a public character.
Recently, this familiar history of land use law has been called
into question. Scholarship reveals that, as early as the colonial period,
private property in America was subject to intrusive land use regula-

17. Id. at 859.
18. Jerold S. Kayden, National Land Use Planning in America: Something Whose Time Has
Never Come, 3 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 445, 449 (2000). Zoning authority arises from a state’s
police powers, which allow it and local governments to promulgate regulations to protect human
health, safety and welfare. John R. Nolon, The Importance of Local Environmental Law, 5
PACE CENTER FOR ENVTL. L. STUDIES 1, 4 (2001).
19. Andrew P. Morriss & Roger E. Meiners, The Destructive Role of Land Use Planning,
14 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 95, 96 (2000).
20. Kayden, supra note 18, at 461.
21. Nolon, supra note 18, at 4.
22. Nolon, supra note 18, at 4.
23. Cutting, supra note 16, at 861.
24. Id.; Morriss & Meiners, supra note 19, at 96.
25. Melvyn R. Durchslag, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., Seventy-Five Years Later:
This is Not Your Father’s Zoning Ordinance, 51 CASE WEST. RES. L. REV. 645, 646-47 (2001).
26. Id.
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tion.27 Restrictions during the eighteenth century were extensive, a
fact which challenges the widely-held belief that, barring the creation
of a nuisance, colonial landowners were generally free to do whatever
they wished with their land.28 Early laws included those that imposed
aesthetic requirements and others that effected forfeitures of private
29
land that was left undeveloped. Many of these restrictions were not
merely aimed at preventing nuisances, but rather sought “to exact
positive benefits from landowners that would be useful to others in
30
the community.” Rather than being considered wholly autonomous
individuals, landowners of this period were more akin to stewards
31
who used their land for public as well as private purposes. Further,
there was a clear understanding of the difference between land use
regulation—which was deemed permissible—and physical appropriation of land—which was compensable.32 This revised picture of early
land use regulation raises important questions about current constitutional jurisprudence that is so highly protective of private property
rights.33
The very local focus of land use regulation was on the brink of
dramatic change in the early 1970’s. Building upon the passage of the
34
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), Senator Henry Jackson led the fight for legislation that would have provided funding for
states to plan in conformance with national land use guidelines.35 Despite support from many sources, including the Nixon administration,

27. See John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the Original Meaning of the
Takings Clause, 94 N.W. U. L. REV. 1099 (2000). Professor Joseph Sax has noted this reality as
well. See Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1453 (1993).
28. See Hart, supra note 27, at 1104.
29. Id. at 1123-26. Other laws allowed private mill owners to use or condemn adjoining private lands under certain conditions, authorized a majority of wetland landowners to impose
their desire to drain property on their neighbors, compelled private lands to be used for mining,
enforced cooperation to create and maintain common fields, and intruded into the lives of landowners who let their land lay idle. See generally id. at 1107–31.
30. Id. at 1130, 1149.
31. Id. at 1131.
32. Id. at 1139. Hart further demonstrates that aggressive land use regulation continued
after the formation of the Republic into the territorial period. Id. at 1143–44.
33. Id. at 1104. Hart notes that the free and unfettered use of property notion has wrongly
informed takings jurisprudence since Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon. Id. See also Sax, supra note
27, at 1453 (“[P]rivatization was never as complete as is often assumed today.”).
34. NEPA announces a national environmental policy and requires federal agencies to
consider the environmental impact of major projects. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331–32 (1994).
35. Jayne E. Daly, A Glimpse of the Past—A Vision for the Future: Senator Henry M. Jackson and National Land-Use Legislation, 28 URB. LAW. 7, 9-14 (1996).
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the effort failed to garner sufficient congressional support.36 The collapse of Senator Jackson’s initiative and the rejection of national land
use planning represented a critical step in the nation’s land use and
environmental history. Thereafter, thoughts of a national, comprehensive land use framework were cast aside in favor of media-specific
pollution control legislation. The era of federal environmental law
was underway.
The advent of environmental law in America thus occurred several decades after land use regulation was firmly in place, but once
the environmental agenda took hold, laws were promulgated with
37
remarkable speed. The Commerce Clause provided constitutional
authority for the new legislation,38 and there were strong philosophical underpinnings as well. Rachel Carson’s influence cannot be understated. Her belief in a basic human right to be free from manmade toxins, in the need to protect species and habitat diversity, and
in a moral obligation to protect the natural environment resonated
with the American public.39 The writings of ecologist Aldo Leopold
were also persuasive.40 Some have characterized America’s embrace
of environmentalism as heroic, comparing Congress’ rescue of the environment from destruction to the eurocentric theme of conquest and
valor. 41
Environmental law, like land use law, has grown in sophistication
during its five decade-plus history. Its earliest efforts were directed at

36. Id. at 32–35. The Nixon administration’s proposal was more limited; it would have focused state planning on selective area planning, instituting federal oversight only for areas of
critical concern. Id. at 19–24.
37. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE,
AND POLICY 105–07 (3d ed. 2000) (calling the years between 1970 and 1980 the “fourth phase”
of federal environmental law and listing ten environmental statutes enacted during that decade
alone: NEPA; the Clean Air Act; the Clean Water Act; the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide &
Rodenticide Act; the Ocean Dumping Act; the Endangered Species Act; the Safe Drinking Water Act; the Toxic Substances Control Act; the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act; and
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act).
38. See Peter M. Manus, Natural Resource Damages from Rachel Carson’s Perspective: A
Rite of Spring in American Environmentalism, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 381, 393 (1996).
39. See id. at 391-92.
40. See ZYGMUNT J. B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY: NATURE,
LAW, AND SOCIETY 7 (2d ed. 1998) (citing Leopold’s 1948 book, A Sand County Almanac).
41. See Kayden, supra note 18, at 258-59. This view is just one example of the patriarchy
that has played a dominant role in the land use-environmental regulation area. See infra text at
notes 181-85.
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conservation and the preservation of wilderness areas.42 During this
era, new regulations protected private property and the economy by
43
keeping them separate from environmental decision-making. Later
laws targeted pollution in specific media, resulting in today’s familiar
44
corpus of environmental statutes. The legal framework was initially
directed at public health rather than land use concerns,45 but as the
law moved into areas such as waste disposal, wetland development
and preservation of green space, land use restrictions were more fre46
quently included in environmental regulations Despite this development, the current federal environmental law complex falls far short
47
of a coordinated and comprehensive land use system.
Throughout its maturation, environmental law has kept private
48
property interests largely intact, helping to service what Professor
Joseph Sax refers to as the “transformative economy.”49 Under environmentalism as it ultimately developed, land remains passive, and
landowners retain a great deal of freedom to transform it however
they wish.50 This separation of environmental regulation from the
land has engendered the abstraction alluded to earlier, by divorcing
51
the environment from personal experience.
When measured against the foundational philosophies of Rachel
Carson and Aldo Leopold, the federal environmental regulatory system is less than satisfying. It is replete with command and control
laws that conserve resources and limit the discharge of pollutants.
Existing legislation regulates what people do but in no way requires a
52
philosophical shift. Critics charge that environmentalism has been
“mainstreamed,” fashioned by an elitism that seeks to protect those
who live in suburbs and rural areas from the ills of the city.53 They
point to the lack of effort to link the environment with the economy
42. Robert R. M. Verchick, In a Greener Voice: Feminist Theory and Environmental Justice, 19 HARV. WOMEN’S L. J. 23, 38 (1996); Sax, supra note 27, at 1443–44; see also PERCIVAL
ET AL., supra note 37, at 101.
43. See Sax, supra note 27, at 1443–44.
44. See Verchick, supra note 42, at 38, 46.
45. See Kayden, supra note 18, at 461.
46. Id. at 461–62.
47. Id. at 472.
48. See Sax, supra note 27, at 1444.
49. Id. at 1442.
50. Id.
51. See Verchick, supra note 42, at 46-47.
52. Peter M. Manus, The Owl, the Indian, the Feminist, and the Brother: Environmentalism
Encounters the Social Justice Movements, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 249, 271 (1996)].
53. Id. at 285-86.
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or social equity.54 Instead, the majority of environmental laws are one
dimensional, resulting in narrowly-focused and linear decision55
making. If anything, today’s environmental law has retreated from
early environmental initiatives that seemed to embrace an ecologi56
cally-based philosophy.
Land use regulation and environmental law thus developed on
two different tracks, beginning at two different times. And despite
areas of overlap, the present regulatory system retains the distinction
between land use and environmental regulation. The failure of the
present regulatory system to more fully confront its interface with
property rights further contributes to the awkward and artificial bifurcation in existence today. The result is a legal framework that often fails to consider the land and people who are directly affected by
the laws. This is perhaps the greatest failure of the land use-enviro
distinction, but it is one that can be addressed by a more integrative
approach.
II. APPLICATIONS
The legal implications of the land use-enviro distinction are numerous and often significant. The following examples represent a
mere sampling of the many ways the distinction colors decisions affecting the environment. It plays a role in preemption cases, where
courts respond by parsing statutes in strained and often contradictory
ways. A similar response is undertaken in sovereign immunity and
Chevron disputes. The dichotomy can also arise in standing and intervention cases, leading courts to focus not only on statutory meaning, but also on the disputing parties’ interests. And in a more indirect but important way, the distinction plays a role in regulatory
takings cases. In all these situations, the distinction provides judges
with a tool of abstraction that allows them to preserve the status quo
while hindering ecologically sound decision-making.
In the federal preemption case of California Coastal Commission
v. Granite Rock Co., the Supreme Court was asked to determine
whether the Coastal Commission’s permit requirement was pre-

54. See J.B. Ruhl, Sustainable Development; A Five-Dimensional Algorithm for Environmental Law, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 31, 32–34 (1999). Professor Ruhl suggests that environmental
law is divided between resourcism—a policy relying on market forces to channel the consumption of resources and environmental protection—and environmentalism—which relies instead
on more collective approaches. Id. at 34.
55. See id. at 46, 48.
56. See Manus, supra note 38, at 431.
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empted by various federal land use statutes and Forest Service regula57
tions. The Court held that Granite Rock, having already obtained
Forest Service permission to mine limestone on federal lands, was required to obtain a permit from the Commission.58
Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court, rejected Granite Rock’s
argument that the state permit requirement was preempted, reasoning that the Commission, through its permit scheme, sought to impose
environmental restrictions while the Forest Service was concerned
59
In highlighting the distinction Justice
with regulating land use.
O’Connor wrote:
The line between environmental regulation and land use planning
will not always be bright . . . . However, the core activity described
by each phrase is undoubtedly different. Land use planning in essence chooses particular uses for the land; environmental regulation, at its core, does not mandate particular uses of the land but
requires only that, however the land is used, damage to the envi60
ronment is kept within prescribed limits.

The Court held that the state could engage in reasonable environmental regulation without being preempted by the federal land use
61
laws at issue. Importantly, the Court believed Congress recognized
the distinction and showed no intent to preempt state regulation.62
Justice Powell, dissenting, questioned whether Congress understood the distinction between land use and environmental regulation.
He found the majority’s distinction to be illogical and based on an erroneous interpretation of the statutes:
A section [of a statute] mandating consideration of environmental
standards in the formulation of land use plans does not demonstrate a general separation between ‘land use planning’ and ‘environmental regulation.’ Rather, [the statute] recognizes that the
Secretary’s land use planning will affect the environment, and thus
63
directs the Secretary to comply with certain pollution standards.

Justices Scalia and White also dissented. They applied the distinction without elaboration, but felt the state permit was preempted

57. 480 U.S. 572, 575 (1987). Traditional preemption analysis looks to see whether there is
a congressional intent to occupy the field, whether state law either conflicts with federal law, or
whether it impedes Congressional objectives. Id. at 581.
58. Id. at 576, 581- 87.
59. Id. at 582.
60. Id. at 587.
61. Id. at 589.
62. Id. at 588, 589-93.
63. Id. at 601.

SPYKE_FINAL4.DOC

Fall 2002]

LAND USE – ENVIRONMENTAL LAW DISTINCTION

03/04/03 2:42 PM

65

because, in their view, the Commission’s permit authority was related
64
to land use control rather than environmental regulation.
On its face the distinction appears to offer a workable preemption test, but Granite Rock illustrates its weaknesses. First, a distinction-oriented test is unpredictable; those justices who recognized the
distinction arrived at different views of the same statutory scheme.
Second, the distinction defies logic; it is folly to mince words in order
to separate land use and environmental terminology when the reality
is that land use decisions invariably affect the environment.
Professor Eric Freyfogle has analyzed Granite Rock in terms of
institutional competence, inquiring whether it is best for state or federal institutions to have the authority to regulate private actions on
65
federal lands. He argues that any distinction between land use and
environmental regulations is vague and uncertain, and warns that it
can lead to inconsistent decisions and manipulation by the regulated
community.66 Instead of placing similar disputes in the hands of
courts, he suggests that preemption decisions should be made at the
lowest level, where local federal agency personnel make the ultimate
land use decisions.67 Under a local, site-specific analysis, preemption
would occur only when a determination is made that federal regulations should operate to the exclusion of state and local law.68
The flaw of Granite Rock is not merely its reliance on a vague
distinction that is both illogical and difficult to apply, but also its failure to allow preemption questions to be addressed by those closest to
the dispute and the land in question. The Court’s preemption analysis, which instead unfolds at higher and more abstract levels, frustrates the creativity and flexibility that could be achieved by local de69
cision-making.
64. Id. at 607-08.
65. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Granite Rock: Institutional Competence and the State Role in Federal Land Planning, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 475 (1988).
66. Id. at 477, 480. For example, the same law could prohibit uses in one area and allow
them in others, rendering it unreasonable environmental regulation in one instance and reasonable in the next. In addition, an entity might purposely create situations where a local law
would prohibit activity. Professor Freyfogle also points out that the rule of Granite Rock would
deem a state law that puts a marginally financially viable operation out of business unreasonable
and thus preempted, while no preemption would exist if the same law was applied to an economically viable concern. Id. at 480-81.
67. Id. at 477.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 514-15. For other preemption cases that rely on the distinction, see Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. Bonsey, 107 F. Supp. 2d 47 (D. Me. 2000) (dealing with state environmental board’s imposition of state’s site law on nuclear power company’s transfer of spent nu-
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Chevron disputes raise the same concerns. Under the traditional
Chevron analysis, courts will defer to a reasonable agency interpreta70
tion of a federal statute if the law is silent on the issue. In the recent
case of Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers, the Supreme Court held that the Corps’
Migratory Bird Rule, as applied to isolated gravel pits, exceeded the
Corps’ jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act.71 The respondents argued for agency deference under Chevron because of the Clean Water Act’s silence regarding the Corps’ power over isolated, nonnavigable wetlands.72 The Court refused the invitation to defer, reasoning that caution is called for when an agency’s interpretation of a
statute nears the limits of congressional power. This can occur when
a statutory interpretation authorizes the federal government to en73
croach on powers traditionally reserved for the states. Applying this
limitation, the Court reasoned that allowing the Corps to extend its
jurisdiction to isolated gravel pits under the Migratory Bird Rule
“would result in a significant impingement of the States’ traditional
and primary power over land and water use.”74 Even though the
Corps’ jurisdiction arose under the Clean Water Act—clearly an environmental statute—the Court characterized the Migratory Bird
Rule as a land use measure.
It is reasonable to ask whether the result would have been the
same if the Court had determined that the Migratory Bird Rule, as interpreted by the Corps, was an environmental, rather than a land use,
regulation. Because the federal government has broad authority to
75
deal with environmental matters under the Commerce Clause, it is
possible that the Court might have shown greater deference to the
agency had the rule been characterized as environmental. Under that
portrayal, there would be less danger of the agency treading on an
clear fuel to a new storage facility) and Ogden Environmental Services v. San Diego, 687 F.
Supp. 1436 (S.D. Cal. 1988) (holding RCRA preempted city’s denial of a conditional use permit
to federal permittee which sought to build an advanced-technology incinerator in the city).
70. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The Chevron
two-step analysis first inquires whether Congressional intent is clearly reflected in the statutory
language. If so, the court will determine the meaning of the language. However, if the intent is
unclear, the court will proceed to Chevron’s second step and defer to an agency’s reasonable
interpretation of the law. See PLATER ET AL., supra note 40, at 429.
71. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001).
72. Id. at 172.
73. Id. at 172-73.
74. Id. at 174.
75. See supra text accompanying note 38.
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area of state power. Thus, in cases involving federal agency interpretation of a statute that could be characterized as either a land use or
an environmental measure, the former construction arguably allows
courts to be less deferential to the agency than if the provision was
characterized as an environmental regulation. And, as in preemption
cases, the ultimate decision rests on statutory construction.
The preemption and Chevron examples illustrate how the judiciary resolves land use-enviro distinction issues by resorting to statutory interpretation. There are other examples as well. In Friends of
76
the Earth v. United States Navy, the Navy challenged FOE’s suit by
arguing that it was protected by sovereign immunity under the Clean
Water Act. The Navy planned to construct a new port facility and
had been issued a city permit under Washington state’s Shoreline
Management Act. FOE sued to have the permitting decision reviewed and to enjoin the Navy from spending any funds on the project under the 1987 National Defense Authorization Act prior to the
completion of the review process.77 The Navy acknowledged that the
Clean Water Act waives the federal government’s sovereign immu78
nity as far as state water pollution regulation is concerned, but argued that the state permit requirement was part of a state land use
program and therefore immunity was not waived.79 The court reviewed the relevant statutory language and held that the state’s implementation of the Coastal Zone Management Act through its
Shoreline Management Act represented a “mixed” program that incorporated both land use and environmental measures. Because the
statute addressed water pollution to some degree, sovereign immunity was waived.80
The distinction can arise in other contexts as well, leading courts
to focus not only on statutory language but also on the interests of the
parties. For example, the distinction could become relevant when
seeking intervention under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
81
24(a)(2). One of the rule’s requirements is that the applicant show
76. 841 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1988).
77. Id. at 929-30.
78. Id. at 934-35. The pertinent sections of the Clean Water Act are 33 U.S.C. §§ 1323 and
1344(t) (2000).
79. Id.at 935.
80. Id. at 935-36.
81. See Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. v Bonsey, 107 F. Supp. 2d 47, 56 (D. Me. 2000).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 (a) (2) provides, “Upon timely application anyone shall be
permitted to intervene in an action . . . when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the
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that its interest will not be adequately represented by existing par82
ties. The rule requires a court to determine whether an applicant’s
interest is identical to that of one of the parties; if so, intervention will
be denied.83 The distinction between land use and environmental
regulation could become relevant in cases involving a state environmental agency’s permitting of a new facility. If an organization promoting wise land use sought to intervene in such a dispute, it could
argue that its land use interests are distinct from the environmental
concerns of the state environmental board. If a court agreed, intervention would be allowed. On the other hand, under a strict application of the distinction, a party devoted to environmental causes might
be prevented from intervening. In both situations, courts would make
their decisions in the abstract, by focusing only on the characterizations of the organizations’ interests. In the latter situation, however,
there is a risk that diverse perspectives specific to the people and locale at issue would be unrepresented.
The distinction could be applied in a similar manner in standing
84
disputes arising under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). In
order to bring an action under the APA a plaintiff must demonstrate
standing under Article III of the Constitution and also claim an injury
that is within the zone of interests protected by the statute that has
allegedly been violated.85 To determine whether this test is met, a
court will ask whether “the plaintiff’s interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it
cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the
suit.”86 The test is not a demanding one; there is no requirement that
the statute must indicate an intent to benefit the particular plaintiff.87
Nevertheless, strict adherence to the distinction could prevent an environmental plaintiff from gaining APA standing for an alleged violation of a federal land use provision, or prevent a plaintiff organization
devoted to land use issues from suing under a federal environmental

disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant’s ability to
protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties.”
82. Maine Yankee, 107 F. Supp. at 56 (citing Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 884 F.2d
629, 637 (1st Cir. 1989)).
83. Id. at 56.
84. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000). The APA allows individuals to bring suit to redress agency
wrongdoing.
85. See Friends of the Earth, 841 F.2d at 931–32.
86. Id. at 932 (quoting Clark v. Securities Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987).
87. Id.
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law. In either case, a court will examine the party’s interests to determine if they are aligned with those of the relevant statute. If a
court is convinced that the plaintiff’s interests are only marginally related to those addressed by the statute, APA standing will not exist.
Once again, the decision would not necessarily be tied to the specific
land and people at issue, but would rest instead on the statute’s terminology and a determination of the plaintiff’s generalized interests.
In a more far-reaching way, the distinction lurks in regulatory
takings cases. As enunciated by the Supreme Court in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, a regulatory taking occurs and compensation must be paid unless a regulation “inhere[s] in the title itself, in
the restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of prop88
erty and nuisance already place upon land ownership.” Pursuant to
this test, a land use regulation that prohibits all economically beneficial use of land will be valid only if based on pre-existing common law
nuisance principles. In most instances the ordinary regulation of industry, including most environmental regulation, will not raise taking
concerns. However, states cannot require owners to leave their land
in its natural state in order to protect an endangered ecosystem unless
compensation is paid, since that type of involvement would exceed
the reach of traditional nuisance law. 89
Professor Sax points out that that the Lucas Court chose to protect the customary view of property rights rather than adopt one that
is more sensitive to ecological needs. He also suggests that the case
set up a dichotomy between laws that seek to maintain land in its
natural state and those that are traditionally seen as derived from the
90
police power. Under Lucas, conventional land use laws such as
zoning ordinances will not violate the takings clause. 91 On the other
hand, environmental laws devoted to the preservation of ecosystems
or species may be invalid. Thus, under Lucas, regulatory taking disputes may hinge on the land use-enviro distinction. The Court merely
colored the distinction differently, as one between nuisance-based
and all other land use laws.
88. Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 (1992) (accepting the argument of a
private property owner who claimed that a state restriction on wetlands development deprived
him of the entire economic value of his land).
89. See Sax, supra note 27, at 1438. Lucas authorizes confiscatory land use regulation only
when the prohibited uses are “not part of [an owner’s] title to begin with.” 505 U.S. at 1027.
90. Id. at 1439, 1441.
91. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-88 (1926), the case that
validated zoning, Justice Sutherland reasoned that nuisance law is helpful in determining
whether regulatory land use ordinances are permissible under the police power.
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Professor Sax suggests yet another distinction. He writes that
Justice Scalia’s decision protects the transformative economic view of
property rights—one that sees land as passive and that allows land
owners to transform their land however they wish. The Court refused
to adopt a nature-based economic view of property—one that sees
92
land as active and that respects ecosystem services and boundaries.
Again, there is an analogy between Sax’ property dichotomy and the
land use-enviro distinction. Land use decisions are based on choices
that determine how land will be used. Those decisions typically serve
the transformative economy because land use decision-makers see
land as passive, in need of human order and development. Environmental decisions, although tied to various social policies, bear at least
some relationship to land. Environmental regulation thus serves the
economy of nature, especially those laws that encourage ecosystem
management. The transformative-ecological distinction in property
rights that Professor Sax draws corresponds not only to the Lucas test
but also to the law’s distinction between land use and environmental
regulation. And as he makes clear, it is a distinction that can lead to
ecologically unsound decisions.93
This brief review of the legal implications of the land use-enviro
distinction leads to four conclusions. First, the distinction is not one
that has little practical effect. Rather it is implicated in a number of
legal settings where it can have critical impact. Second, the distinction presents a formalistic test that is questionable in logic and unpredictable in application. Third, it stifles ecologically sound decisionmaking by providing courts with an abstract mechanism focused on
statutory language, legislative intent, and the generalized interests of
the parties rather than encouraging consideration of the specific locality and diverse interests which will be impacted by the decision. Finally, the continued application of the distinction works to preserve
the dominant role of property rights in environmental law.
III. REALITIES
There are many indications that the land use–enviro distinction is
losing force, despite its ongoing presence in the law. For example, a
number of the familiar criticisms of mainstream environmentalism in94
directly raise questions about the distinction. In general, current
92. Sax, supra note 27, at 1441-42.
93. Id. at 1454-55.
94. The term “mainstream environmentalism” is borrowed from Professor Peter Manus,
who uses it to describe the current state of federal environmental law, which he sees as driven

SPYKE_FINAL4.DOC

Fall 2002]

LAND USE – ENVIRONMENTAL LAW DISTINCTION

03/04/03 2:42 PM

71

regulatory programs permit a certain amount of pollution and
95
authorize enforcement actions against those who exceed the limits.
The focus is on the reduction of the total amount of pollution rather
than its distribution.96 This approach has been attacked as one97
dimensional, costly, ineffective and troubled by conflicting laws.
There are other concerns as well. Those who approached environmental policy believing the earth’s resources would somehow replenish themselves have begun to acknowledge that environmental
decisions must become less concerned with protecting the economy
98
An awareness has
and more mindful of nature’s limitations.
emerged that the nature-serves-mankind perspective must change.99
On other fronts, advocates point to environmental law’s failure to incorporate ecological concerns and human-oriented issues such as ur100
Imporban blight, housing problems, and environmental justice.
tantly, many of the social ills that are now seen as integral to
environmental decision-making are tied directly to unwise land use
decisions.101
A different critique suggests that environmentalism has purposely evolved in ways that avoid greater self-sacrifice and behavior
102
modification: “[C]ourts and legislators work to segregate and narrowly define environmental issues and decisions as a means of insulating and thus protecting the environmental cause from its persistent
threat, the erosion of selflessness.”103 One way this trend has manifested itself is in environmental law’s hierarchical system, which con104
tinues to separate property rights from environmental interests.
The land use-enviro distinction allows the current system to persevere despite its numerous critics. The distinction is hard-wired into
the deliberative process at the legislative and judicial levels, and by
by the market system and having a diluted political philosophy. See Manus, supra note 52, at
252-55. More generally, he uses the term to describe the environmental movement that evolved
since the early 1960’s and the body of law that currently dominates federal environmental regulation. Id. at 255 n. 29.
95. See Cutting, supra note 16, at 830-31.
96. See Verchick, supra note 42, at 66.
97. See Ruhl, supra note 54, at 43; Daly, supra note 35, at 8.
98. Mark Sagoff, Settling America or the Concept of Place in Environmental Ethics, 12 J.
ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 349 (1992).
99. Warner, supra note 8, at 456.
100. See Daly, supra note 35, at 8; Manus, supra note 38, at 431.
101. See Daly, supra note 35, at 8-9.
102. See Manus, supra note 52, at 251-52.
103. Id. at 252.
104. See id. at 296.
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keeping environmental matters separate from land use issues, it sets
up a paradigm of exclusion rather than inclusion. Further, it frustrates the implementation of more integrated frameworks through
which land use decisions could be made with a broad socio-ecological
sensitivity.
Intricate legal tests and compartmentalization are endemic in
mainstream environmentalism, so perhaps the longevity of the land
105
use-enviro distinction should come as no surprise. But it should be
remembered that early in the environmental movement there was an
opportunity to adopt a more holistic approach to the nation’s land use
and environmental problems. Those who lobbied for national land
use legislation in the early 1970’s recognized that land use and environmental decisions were linked:
To a very great extent all environmental management decisions are
ultimately related to land use decisions. All environmental problems are outgrowths of land use patterns. The collective land use
decisions which we make today and in the future will dictate our
success in providing the American people with a quality life in
106
quality surroundings.

Rather than being widely accepted, the distinction between land use
and environmental measures was questioned in the earliest days of
the environmental movement. Current scholarship similarly points
out that “the intersection of environmental and land-use policy is be107
coming increasingly apparent.” There is a realization that land use
problems are environmental problems and that local land use decisions often have environmental impacts beyond the area in which the
land is located.108
There are promising signs that environmental law is beginning to
look beyond its traditional boundaries and embrace more integrative
109
policies. Efforts are being made to include broader social interests
105. Two of the many examples of environmental law’s narrow focus and complexity include RCRA’s solid waste definitional rules and the regulations governing new source review
under the Clean Air Act. See respectively 42 U.S. C. § 6903 (27) (1994) and accompanying
regulations at 40 C.F.R. § 261.2 (2001), and 42 U.S.C. § 7503 (1994) and accompanying regulations at 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.1-60.19 (2001).
106. See Daly, supra note 35, at 15 (quoting COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR
AFFAIRS, BACKGROUND PAPERS ON PAST AND PENDING LEGISLATION AND THE ROLES OF
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, CONGRESS, AND THE STATES IN LAND USE POLICY AND
PLANNING, 92ND CONG., 2D SESS. (1972)).
107. See Kayden, supra note 18, at 456, 461- 62.
108. See Freyfogle, supra note 7, at 580.
109. See Manus, supra note 52, at 298-99. Professor Manus hopes that environmental law
will rediscover its more holistic and interconnected foundations, making it more aligned with
Rachel Carson’s philosophy. Id. at 299.
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in environmental decision-making. More and more, environmental
initiatives reflect an ecosystem awareness, where “[l]and is in service,
[where] it is part of a community where single ownership of an ecological service is rare . . . and where [l]and has a dual purpose, both
transformative and ecological.”110 At the same time, Americans are
beginning to accept the idea that their behavior must change if the
environment is to be preserved.111
The gradual shift towards an awareness of the linkage between
land use and environmental regulation has led to what some describe
as “an unnoticed revolution” in the federal government’s regulation
112
Increasingly, the federal government is taking
of development.
steps to address the unfortunate results of misguided land use deci113
Some argue that the sum of those efforts, reflected in envisions.
ronmental, public land, transportation and housing laws, has established a de facto national land use planning scheme.114 Although the
federal government’s involvement in land use is admittedly greater
than many might realize, it still falls short of representing a coordinated national solution.115
Nevertheless, the federal government’s involvement in land use
regulation has expanded, and as this has occurred states and local
governments have become more active in environmental regulation.
Current zoning ordinances now accomplish far more than prevention
of the types of nuisances that underpinned Euclid. Local laws routinely address environmental matters such as wetland regulation and
116
This developthe preservation of green space and historic sites.
ment, which has largely occurred within the last decade, suggests the
emergence of a local environmental ethic.117 Even more certain is the

110. See Sax, supra note 27, at 1445 (listing this as one of a number of characteristics of the
economy of nature).
111. Manus, supra note 52, at 298-99; Sagoff, supra note 98, at 351-52
112. See Peter A. Buchsbaum, James E. Brookshire & Roger Platt, The Federal Government
and Land Use: The Not So Quiet Evolution Continues, 28 URB. LAW. 517 (1996).
113. JOHN NOLON, WELL GROUNDED; USING LOCAL LAND USE AUTHORITY TO ACHIEVE
SMART GROWTH 15 (ELI 2001).
114. Kayden, supra note 18, at 453.
115. Peter A. Buchsbaum, Federal Regulation of Land Use: Uncle Sam the Permit Man, 25
URB. LAW. 589, 593 (1993). Mr. Buchsbaum mentions the land use components of the Clean
Water Act’s wetlands regulation and various provisions of the Clean Air Act and the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act. Id. at 593, 623-25.
116. See Durschlag, supra note 25, at 646-47; see also Morriss & Meiners, supra note 19 at 96
(ultimately arguing that the common law is a preferable alternative to complex land use planning).
117. See Nolon, supra note 18, at 4.
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reality that it is increasingly difficult to label local laws as either
118
purely land use or purely environmental measures.
The apparent conflux of federal and local laws that deal with
land use and environmental issues only enhances the confusion regarding the intersection of federal environmental laws and local land
119
Yet it is clear that land use planning is becoming more
use laws.
common at the federal level and that environmental regulation is ap120
pearing more frequently at the local level. At the very least this
convergence suggests that the land use-enviro distinction is blurring.
Developments in property theory have accompanied the shift in
121
Arguments have been
land use and environmental regulation.
made that property norms have undergone an ecological transformation of sorts, becoming less abstract and more closely tied to land and
community.122 It is suggested that “land health” has become one of
the many goals that property law now serves, in addition to the protection of privacy and investments and the promotion of economic
growth.123 Property law’s response to environmental concerns reflects
the social side of property, and in particular the American public’s
growing acceptance of a balance between property and environmental rights.124 It additionally reflects the reality that decisions regarding both property and environmental issues are ultimately about
125
the distribution of rights. Although this development has met with
resistance at the judicial level,126 there is little doubt that property law
is being wooed by ecosystem demands.

118. See Freyfogle, supra note 65, at 487.
119. See NOLON, supra note 113, at 6.
120. See generally, Kayden, supra note 18.
121. This is not surprising, given the flexibility of the law in general and property law in particular. The idea that property rights are static and inviolate defies the history of property law;
over time, private property rights have been restricted in various ways, responding to advances
in science, changing morals and new technology. See Poirier, supra note 6, at 48. The changing
goals of political forces ultimately shape the rights and obligations of property law. Freyfogle,
supra note 7, at 578.
122. See generally Freyfogle, supra note 7, at 578.
123. Id. at 583-84. Professor Freyfogle suggests the emergence of a land ethic of care and
ecological sensitivity. For an article discussing contrasting land ethics at work in the United
States, see Fred Bosselman, Four Land Ethics: Order, Reform, Responsibility, Opportunity, 24
ENVTL. L. 1439 (1994).
124. See Poirier, supra note 6, at 56, 85.
125. Id. at 44.
126. See generally Sax, supra note 27. Professor Sax recognizes that ecological perspectives
are becoming more prevalent and questions why the Lucas court failed to accommodate the
economy of nature in some way in its decision. Id. at 1446. Sax believes property law is now
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This re-shaping of property is evident in some of the more concrete examples of the distinction’s dissolution. At the local level are
smart growth initiatives that attack sprawl by channeling growth in
ways that leave large expanses of the natural environment undis127
turbed. Other examples include floating and overlay zones, including planned unit developments (PUDs), transferable development
rights (TDRs), and other forms of incentive zoning.128 All of these
examples, which to varying degrees restrict the free development of
property, have been utilized at least in part to protect environmental
amenities.
There are state level examples as well, including NEPA-like laws
that have been enacted in a number of jurisdictions. New York’s
State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA), for example, requires local agencies to prepare environmental impact assessments
129
An alternative approach has been taken by
for various projects.
Pennsylvania, which recently amended its Municipalities Planning
Code to require the state Department of Environmental Protection to
take comprehensive planning and zoning ordinances into account
130
when making permitting decisions. Like the local examples, these
state initiatives inject environmental concerns into property and land
use decision-making.
Undoubtedly, the most significant example of the demise of the
land use-enviro distinction is the global move toward sustainable development. Both the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 call for integrated decision-making that would require the substantive integration

moving toward a response to ecosystem sensitivities, signaling an era when property rights will
serve both the transformative and ecological economies. Id. at 1445.
127. See NOLON supra note 113, at 38-39.
128. See generally id. at 207-58.
129. See id. at 183; N.Y. ENVIR. CONSER. §§ 8-0101 et seq. (2002). SEQRA’s purpose is “to
declare a state policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man
and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and enhanced human and community resources; and to enrich the understanding of the
ecological systems, natural, human and community resources important to the people of the
state.” Id. at § 8-0101.
130. 53 P.S. § 10619.2 (a) (West Supp. 2002). The pertinent language provides that state
agencies “shall consider and may rely upon comprehensive plans and zoning ordinances when
reviewing applications for the . . . permitting of . . . facilities.” Id. Reliance on land use planning
and zoning ordinance information is limited to situations where comprehensive zoning, joint
zoning, or cooperative municipal agreements are in place. See PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT
OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION POLICY OFFICE, POLICY FOR CONSIDERATION OF LOCAL
COMPREHENSIVE PLANS AND ZONING ORDINANCES IN DEP REVIEW OF PERMITS FOR
FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE, Document 012-0200-001, 1-2 (June 8, 2002).

SPYKE_FINAL4.DOC

76

03/04/03 2:42 PM

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

[Vol. 13:55

of social, economic, and environmental issues.131 These principles
were strongly endorsed by President Clinton’s Commission on Sustainable Development, which expressed a need to replace past practices with a decision-making model that embraces the economy, environment, and social equity.132
The goal of sustainable development is to achieve “a timeless,
spatially seamless fusion—not separation—of environment, economy,
133
and equity.” It stands in sharp contrast to the resource-directed environmentalism of today, which focuses on what is good for the current economy and individual environmental problems. The implementation of sustainable development will alter this paradigm in a
complex way by seeking the “optimum maximization” of environment, economy, and equity at one place and at one time. It will further require repeated evaluation of decisions on various geographic
and time scales.134 Public participation and creativity will be part of
the process, as will a reformulation of property law that integrates en135
vironmental, social and economic issues. Sustainable development
may be a long way from replacing mainstream environmentalism, but
it is clear that the concept of sustainability is changing the regulatory
landscape in ways that will further erode the land use-enviro distinction.136
IV. FEMINISM
The legal picture that emerges from the foregoing discussion is
hardly one where land use, environmental and property laws are discrete. Instead, the land use-enviro distinction appears to be crumbling, and property theory—if not its norms—is responding to this
breakdown. This article might end here, since the eradication of the
distinction seems certain. However, the metamorphosis from distinction to integration begs for a more searching analysis. Feminism offers one lens through which the distinction’s demise can be more
closely examined.
131. See John C. Dernbach, Sustainable Development as a Framework for National Governance, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 50 (1998). The Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 were drafted
at the 1992 Earth Summit, convened in Rio de Janeiro. Id. at 3.
132. See Ruhl, supra note 54, at 39-40 (suggesting an algorithm to implement sustainable
development).
133. Id. at 32.
134. See id. at 57.
135. See Dernbach, supra note 131, at 65, 80.
136. To put it in the words of Professor Ruhl, “Environmentalism is dead. Long live sustainable development.” Ruhl, supra note 54, at 33.
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Feminism has been described as “a self-consciously critical stance
toward the existing order with respect to the various ways it affects
137
different women ‘as women.’” It becomes the voice of the “other”
within what it sees as a patriarchal society.138 An expansive view of
feminism does not limit its focus to social domination based on sex;
rather, it searches for domination of all kinds, including man’s domination of the natural environment.139 It is a perspective that can help
analyze and improve the law and one that has been applied to many
140
legal areas.
While traditional legal methodology seeks predictability and certainty, feminist legal methods value flexibility in legal rules and seek
141
to identify missing points of view. Three such methods are often associated with feminism: asking the “woman question,” feminist prac142
tical reasoning, and consciousness raising.
Asking the woman question strives to uncover gender implications in apparently neutral laws, revealing how those laws ignore
women’s experiences. The goal of the questioning is to uncover male
bias and demonstrate that it is not inevitable. Even though the interrogation is partially substantive, it is nevertheless a legal method;
there is no requirement that the ultimate decision must favor
143
women. Further, biases that are uncovered need not be intentional;
what is important is that neutrality should never be assumed.144 When
directed at environmental justice issues, liberal feminist questioning
has revealed that decisions regarding the location of polluting facilities are often made with little effort to incorporate the values and experiences of women and minorities.145

137. Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 833 (1990).
138. See Ynestra King, The Ecology of Feminism and the Feminism of Ecology, in HEALING
THE WOUNDS: THE PROMISE OF ECOFEMINISM 20 (Judith Plant, ed. 1989) [hereinafter
HEALING THE WOUNDS]. From a feminist perspective both women and nature are the “others”—those who are subordinated by male domination and scientific and technological domination. See id. at 21.
139. Id. at 20.
140. See Bartlett, supra note 137, at 835, 842-43 (including criminal law, employment law,
and contracts law).
141. Id. at 832.
142. Id. at 829. Professor Robert Verchick identifies the same three methods, but refers to
them as unmasking patriarchy, contextual reasoning, and consciousness-raising. See Verchick,
supra note 42, at 31.
143. See Bartlett, supra note 137, at 837, 845-46.
144. See Verchick, supra note 42, at 36.
145. Id. at 37.
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Feminist practical reasoning incorporates the perspectives uncovered by other feminist methods; it is suspicious of bright line rules
and enlarges the scope of factors that are relevant to decision146
It rejects “the monolithic community often assumed in
making.
male accounts of practical reasoning and seeks to identify perspec147
tives not represented in the dominant culture . . . .” A focus on context is key.148 It is a method that erodes the distinction between the
149
objective and subjective, that applies to diverse legal problems, and
that can uncover gender oppression and isolation.150 When applied to
environmental justice, feminist practical reasoning has been shown to
encompass the perspectives of minorities who see connections between their health, living conditions, and the environment. Traditional legal methods had long overlooked these viewpoints, resulting
151
Feminist practical
in numerous examples of distributive injustice.
reasoning, or contextual reasoning, expands the scope of environmentalism and offers a new way to look at environmental problems.152
Consciousness-raising, the third feminist method, seeks shared
experience. It is “an interactive and collaborative process of articulating one’s experiences and making meaning of them with others
153
A collective, nonwho also articulate their experiences.”
hierarchical effort is part of the process, as is greater public participation at the community level.154 This method can enhance knowledge
and is capable of being implemented in formal and informal ways.155

146. Id. at 43. This method is achieved by imagining the experiences of affected women,
looking at the issue from the bottom up. The idea is to consider many affected communities and
merge the emotional experience of women and marginalized individuals with more abstract legal analysis. Id. at 45; see also Bartlett, supra note 137, at 854–55, 863.
147. See Bartlett, supra note 137. at 855.
148. See Verchick, supra note 42, at 43-45.
149. Id.at 45.
150. See Bartlett, supra note 137, at 858.
151. See, e.g., Tseming Yang, Melding Civil Rights and Environmentalism; Finding Environmental Justice’s Place in Environmental Regulation, 26 HARV. ENVT’L L. REV. 5, 17-27
(2002). Studies show that toxic waste sites were often located in predominantly African and
Hispanic American communities, significantly greater penalties for violations of hazardous
waste laws were imposed in predominantly white communities, and overtly racist membership
policies existed in the early days of the Sierra Club, among other examples. Id.
152. See Verchick, supra note 42, at 46. Contextual reasoning reveals that some people understand the environment to include the home and workplace, not merely the natural media
outside. Id. at 46-47.
153. See Bartlett, supra note 137, at 863-64.
154. See Verchick, supra note 42, at 52-53.
155. Id. at 864. Small groups, public meetings, art and the media are just a few examples of
how consciousness-raising can occur. Id.
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In the environmental justice area, consciousness-raising can be ac156
complished through various means of community education.
Posing the woman question in relation to the land use-enviro distinction queries whether neutral factors such as private property
rights, history, or state and local government prerogatives account for
the distinction’s existence, or whether the distinction can be traced to
some form of gender oppression or isolation. Feminist scholarship
suggests that patriarchy does, in part, motivate the distinction.
The feminist tradition posits that Western culture places both
women and nature in the background, denying men’s dependence on
157
It further sees misogyny as the basis for the manthem.
158
Within this system man transcends
culture/woman-nature divide.
both woman and nature, which are dominated and excluded.159 The
domination and transcendence of nature under this model make envi160
ronmental issues a concern of feminism.
Feminism targets the man-woman dualism that values masculine
interests over feminine concerns and that fails to recognize any overlap between the two. Dualism does more than separate men from
women; it creates a world in which issues associated with dominant
masculine values are elevated above issues associated with the femi161
nine concerns of the excluded and suppressed. This bifurcation is
apparent in the Enlightenment’s separation of the mind from the
body and nature, and in its companion concepts of objectivity, impartiality, and the rejection of emotion.162 Devotees of mechanism, notably Francis Bacon, became engaged in a related quest to impose order
on the natural environment, leading to what Carolyn Merchant described as “the death of nature.”163 This quest for order fueled the
emergence of centralized government and industrial regulation in
seventeenth century Europe.164 Masculine domination, and the re-

156. See id. at 52-53 (noting that community education, or “grassroots consciousnessraising,” results in a “dynamic and interactive network of citizen activists”).
157. VAL PLUMWOOD, FEMINISM AND THE MASTERY OF NATURE 21 (1993).
158. King, supra note 138, at 19.
159. PLUMWOOD, supra note 157, at 22-23.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 31. Professor Plumwood defines dualism as “the process by which contrasting
concepts (for example masculine and feminine gender identities) are formed by domination and
subordination and constructed as oppositional and exclusive.” Id.
162. See generally id. at 108-20.
163. See MERCHANT, supra note 7, at 193 (arguing the Scientific Revolution removed the
“animistic, organic assumptions about the cosmos”).
164. Id. at 205.
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lated separation of man and nature thus form the basis of dualism.165
It is a philosophy of hyper-separation, radical exclusion and polarization that in many ways remains in place today.166
The ramifications of dualism are significant. One result is instrumentalism, the dominant figure’s use of the oppressed as a means
to an end. At its most extreme, dualist instrumentalism dictates that
dominant male interests use women as wives and child-bearers while
167
nature is used to service masculine needs. Another result of dualism is homogenization, which discounts diversity by seeing dominated interests as interchangeable. Women are considered to be all
alike; and water and air, no matter where situated, are regulated in a
similar way.168 A third effect of dualism is a moral one. Ethics are
held and defined by the dominant party, in this case, the white male.
In the most simplified setting, the dominant party discards the concerns of inferior others that might otherwise place restraints on him.
The others are perceived as having no needs of their own, leaving little room for sympathy. The result is a moral dualism.169
These ramifications of dualism have left the western world with
economic, scientific, and technological perspectives that fail to fully
value natural resources. Instead, nature’s value and diversity are of170
Not surprisingly,
ten ignored by the transcendent dominant view.
the scientific revolution and the rise of capitalism have been linked to
this philosophy.171 The hyper-separation of man and nature, which

165. See PLUMWOOD, supra note 157, at 42-44. Much of the fabric of dualism was woven by
the Greek philosophers; the Enlightenment may have refined the fabric, but did not create it.
Id. at 71–75. Further, Platonic thought, which embraced dualism, was later reflected in Christian doctrine and the pre-Enlightenment thought of the West. By the time of Descartes, there
was a clear separation between the mind and body, the rational and nature, and both body and
nature were seen as inferior to the rational sphere of the mind. Id. at 71-75, 89.
166. See id. at 48-49.
167. Id. at 53.
168. See id. at 53-55. The Clean Air Act’s National Ambient Air Quality Standards, which
are nationally uniform, are an example. See 42 U.S.C. § 109 (2000). Related to homogenization
is the patriarchal goal of universalization. During the colonial era, conquering nations promoted development, with a goal of having the conquered nations remake themselves in the image of the West. See Vandana Shiva, Development, Ecology, and Women, in HEALING THE
WOUNDS, supra note 138, at 80.
169. PLUMWOOD, supra note 157, at 145-46.
170. Id. at 70, 101. Science sees the world mathematically, objectively. Quantities, not
quality of life, matters. We see this in NAAQS, TMDLs, LAER, RACT, MACT, and BACT,
just to name a few of environmental law’s uniform, data-based acronyms. See also Corinne
Kumar D’Souza, A New Movement, A New Hope: East Wind, West Wind, and the Wind from the
South, in HEALING THE WOUNDS, supra note 138, at 30- 31.
171. PLUMWOOD, supra note 157, at 111; see also MERCHANT, supra note 7, at 173-78.
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was retained through much of the twentieth century, still guides industrial development and makes it difficult, if not impossible, to see
172
man as part of nature. The result is the absence of a sense of continuity with the earth or connection with place.173
Ecofeminism more closely addresses the impact of patriarchy
and dualism on nature by linking feminism with environmental is174
sues. This perspective rejects the notion that women and nature are
inferior, and analyzes environmental degradation by considering the
connections between the oppression of women and the domination of
nature.175 To ecofeminists, mainstream environmentalism’s reliance
on the sciences and traditionally masculine agendas render it “ecologically dysfunctional.”176 Particularly disturbing is environmentalism’s systemic linear thinking, which fails to account for the interde177
pendencies that abound in the natural world. Development is seen
as a social illness that fails to embrace feminine values by marginalizing the realities of conservation and ecology. More pointedly, the
pro-development agenda is perceived as patriarchal, valuing dollars
over quality-of-life and rejecting the sustaining roles of both women
and nature.178
Where does all this lead in relation to the land use-enviro distinction and the woman question? One way to approach the distinction is
to see it as drawing a line between development and conservation.
Land use decisions determine what can be built where; environmental
decisions determine how to keep air, water, and land clean. The drive
to impose order on the landscape through land use decisions—building roads and planning industrial parks or residential subdivisions—is
a masculine endeavor. On the other hand, environmental initiatives—such as clean air regulations and biodiversity protection—can
be characterized as feminist responses that seek to acknowledge connections between natural resources and human survival. Viewed in
172. See PLUMWOOD, supra note 157, at 70- 71; MERCHANT, supra note 7, at 291.
173. PLUMWOOD, supra note 157, at 103. This is so despite today’s clear acceptance of human dependency on nature and the knowledge that to deny nature is foolish. Id. at 94.
174. “Ecofeminists believe that patriarchy—men’s mistreatment and subordination of
women—and environmental despoliation are linked.” Richard Delgado, Our Better Natures: A
Revisionist View of Joseph Sax’s Public Trust Theory of Environmental Protection, and Some
Dark Thoughts on the Possibility of Law Reform, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1209, 1222 (1991).
175. See PLUMWOOD, supra note 157, at 35-36; King, supra note 138, at 24.
176. See Rosemary Radford Ruether, Toward an Ecological-Feminist Theology of Nature, in
HEALING THE WOUNDS, supra note 138, at 148 (explaining that systems of dominance and control fail to appreciate the “larger relational patterns within which particular facts stand.”).
177. See id. at 148–49.
178. See Shiva, supra note 168, at 82–83.
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this way, the distinction pits the male (development) against the female (nature). Further, while land use decisions are routinely made
by zoning boards that are often male-dominated, environmental decisions have been greatly influenced by the writing of women, notably
Rachel Carson,179 and continue to be informed by diverse grass roots
organizations that promote the interests of women and nature.180
Yet the mere characterization of the land use-enviro distinction
as a male-female dichotomy is not enough. The woman question
seeks to uncover bias in the distinction; thus the question becomes
whether the male–female separation can be linked to oppression. It is
not difficult to respond that bias does support the land use-enviro distinction. It is reflected in the law’s long-standing recognition of state
181
and local government authority over land use matters, a principle
that leads courts to adopt a hands-off attitude when reviewing local
land use decisions. 182 The presumption of validity afforded local land
use decisions, coupled with the patriarchal nature of land use controls, creates a danger that concerns about ecosystem health will be
suppressed. Whenever that risk becomes a reality, land use decisions—driven by masculine values—will dominate environmental efforts.
Research also suggests that male decision-makers are more likely
to accept risk if they stand to benefit from their decision. At the same
time, women and minority groups tend to be more vulnerable to envi183
It is not hard to imagine how these risk-related
ronmental risks.
tendencies might result in land use decisions that neglect feminine
and environmental values. Land use choices that boast commercial
benefits are likely to be embraced by male decision-makers despite
environmental risks that would concern women and minorities. Thus,
the selection of economically attractive land use alternatives may well
carry a danger of gender and minority oppression.

179. See generally Manus, supra note 38.
180. See, e.g., Verchick, supra note 42, at 27 (describing the environmental justice movement as a feminist movement). Professor Verchick repeatedly states that political, business and
bureaucratic institutions remain dominated by men. Id. at 79, 82.
181. State authority to enact land use regulations is grounded in established nuisance law.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031.
182. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Richmond Heights City Council, 690 N.E.2d 510, 514 (Ohio 1998)
(noting the presumption in favor of state land use regulations: “A zoning regulation is presumed
to be constitutional unless determined . . . to be clearly arbitrary and unreasonable without substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the community.”).
183. Verchick, supra note 42, at 80 (citing James Flynn, et al., Gender, Race, and Perception
of Environmental Health Risks, 14 RISK ANALYSIS 1101, 1106 (1994).
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Patriarchy is also apparent in the land use-enviro distinction’s
tendency to pit property rights against community rights. Land use
devices bestow individual rights on property owners by allowing them
to use their land in various ways. Environmental regulation, on the
other hand, almost always imposes limitations, restricting property
184
rights in ways that make them more communitarian. The law’s current embrace of property rights and disaffection for communal notions of property allows masculine values associated with land use and
development to prevail over feminine environmental and communal
values. This outcome reveals yet another way that the land useenviro distinction masks dualism.
To the extent the distinction leads courts to engage in abstract
analysis by focusing on statutory language to the exclusion of local
concerns, bias is revealed yet again. The art of statutory interpretation occurs purely in the courtroom, in the realm of mind and reason;
concerns related to local ecosystems and their inhabitants do not frequently enter this arena. Thus the routine application of the distinction privileges abstract rationalization over the contextualized domain of feminine, nature-oriented values.
Unmasking the distinction’s patriarchy also reveals what Professor Margaret Radin calls “institutional bad coherence,” which occurs
when society’s institutions “uniformly exhibit the bad conception of
185
things,” even though viable alternatives exist. Entrenched distinctions in the law exemplify bad coherence, presenting feminists with
the opportunity to transform the law by including oppressed perspec186
tives. The land use-enviro distinction, which is both reflective of patriarchy and institutionally entrenched, is a prime example of the type
of bad coherence that invites feminists to become agents of legal
change.
The second feminist legal method, contextual or feminine practical reasoning, also sheds light on the distinction. Here, diverse and
conflicting perspectives are actively sought in order to collect new
facts that can contribute to rule making. Ideally, this methodology
187
results in more responsive and flexible rules. In a dispute where the

184. See supra text accompanying notes 122-24.
185. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699,
1721 (1990).
186. Id. Professor Radin uses the example of the final days of coverture, when legal institutions treated women as inferior to their husbands. Id.
187. See Bartlett, supra note 137, at 851-52 (explaining how feminine practical reasoning
uses rules as signposts that help reconcile past wisdom with fresh facts).
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land use-enviro distinction plays a role, this method would seek perspectives from all stakeholders. In a preemption scenario, for example, a court might be asked to do more than simply engage in abstract
statutory construction to determine whether the competing interests
at issue are either land use-related or environmentally based. In addition, a court might be invited to consider the patriarchy inherent in
the system and to be receptive to the idea of listening to other voices.
These would include the voices of people who live where the decision
will have its greatest impact, groups who argue on behalf of the local
environment, and individuals who will implement the project. Under
this type of deliberation, the preemption doctrine would remain intact, but the land use-enviro distinction would dissolve as the analysis
becomes less abstract and more flexible to accommodate concrete
and diverse interests.
Consciousness-raising can also be used to confront the distinc188
tion. This feminist method seeks to enhance knowledge, and there
are at least two ways in which this can occur. First, local inhabitants
can become more informed about decisions that will affect their surroundings. This increased awareness can be realized through educational initiatives, informal get-togethers or more structured events. In
addition, the knowledge that is gained from these efforts can be
brought to the attention of decision-makers. Utilizing this method
will both increase public participation and ground decisions closer to
the locality where the impact will be felt.
While the application of feminist methods illustrates the validity
and value of a feminist critique of the land use-enviro distinction, the
application has an important ethical dimension as well. As mentioned, the ethics of dualism are those of dominant masculine interests that fail to perceive or sympathize with suppressed viewpoints.189
The western ethical model has been criticized by feminists and others,190 who point out that the dominant cultural ethic is both linear and
homocentric.191 The ethics of ecofeminism challenge this view by emphasizing the significance of nature, the interconnections between all

188. Id. at 863 – 64.
189. See supra text accompanying note 170.
190. See PLUMWOOD, supra note 157, at 152. See generally Comment, Jon K. Abdoney, Environmental Ethics: The Geography of the Soul, 27 CUMB.. L. REV. 1217 (1996-97)(suggesting
that environmental ethics should become more geographically contextualized); Sagoff, supra
note 98 (noting the need for an ethic focused on community, integration and care).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 176-77 (Ruether).
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living things, and the need to show compassion for the powerless.192 It
is a value-based ethical response, including principles of respect, ac193
countability and harmony.
A feminist ethical critique would address dualism in a number of
ways, primarily by recognizing the value of diverse input from those
who have been excluded, and by adopting an integrative and non194
hierarchical system of thought. Defeating dualism will require “not
just recognition of difference, but recognition of a complex, interacting pattern of both continuity and difference.”195 The challenge will
be to allow for differentiation without creating a hierarchy, and to
understand that all living things possess an extended teleology, but
with valuable differences.196 Humans must see themselves as unique
but not separate from nature, and must understand that their ability
197
to change nature is matched by nature’s own forces.
The ethical shift away from dualism will require cultivating an
ethic of concern for the perspectives of those who traditionally have
been dominated. Moral choices must be made based on concerns for
198
both humans and nature, replacing the traditional masculine,
autonomous and rational actor with a more integrated ecological
self.199 Rather than disregarding differences and adopting formulaic
solutions, which is the norm in traditional environmental ethics, the
new self would recognize diverse needs and impose limits on the
self.200 There would be an ethic of cooperation, balance and mutual201
ity, of interaction between humans and nature. The new self would
192. See Starhawk, Feminist, Earth-Based Spirituality and Ecofeminism, in HEALING THE
WOUNDS, supra note 138, at 177-80.
193. See Margo Adair & Sharon Howell, The Subjective Side of Power, in HEALING THE
WOUNDS, supra note 138, at 226 (stating that the principles of respect, accountability, and harmony must become the core of our efforts to collectively effectuate change); see also Warner,
supra note 8, at 482.
194. See PLUMWOOD, supra note 157, at 59. Professor Plumwood’s proposal to overcome a
“dualised identity” includes five steps: 1) a recognition of the individual contributions of the
backgrounded other; 2) the adoption of an integrated model rather than one of exclusion; 3)
exploration of the stories of the other rather than its qualities; 4) respect for and understanding
of the values and needs of the other; and 5) acknowledgement of diversity among the other. Id.
195. Id. at 67.
196. Id. at 135.
197. Id. at 137.
198. Id. at 151 (differentiating between the human self-interest (egoism) and a human interest in others (altruism), and encouraging the adoption of a combination of these two theories).
199. Id. at 154-55.
200. Id. at 157 (adopting a view of “mutuality” in which both kinship and difference are recognized and embraced).
201. Id. at 164.

SPYKE_FINAL4.DOC

86

03/04/03 2:42 PM

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

[Vol. 13:55

be called upon to cultivate the virtues of “care, respect, gratitude,
202
sensitivity, reverence and friendship.”
A virtue-based ethical system envisioning an ecological self is
one way to defeat dualism. Its concepts are at once local and contextualized rather than abstract, allowing for particularity without losing
203
human identity. This new focus does not dispense with abstract reasoning altogether: “The expulsion of the master identity from the
western construction of reason requires not the abandonment of reason itself, but an effort to instal (sic) another, less hierarchical, more
democratic and plural identity in its place.”204
The ecofeminist ethical model adds to the critique of the land
use-enviro distinction in a meaningful way, helping to ground a response to the dualism inherent in the dichotomy. A virtue-based
ethic tied to an ecological self challenges the existence of the distinction. Its core concepts of context, inclusion, integration, care and respect suggest that any decision having an impact on natural resources
has an ethical dimension. Importantly, the ethical response would not
view land use and environmental protection measures as distinct.
Rather, land use decisions would be based on contextualized, integrative decision-making that incorporates concern and respect for the
natural environment with the values and needs of those who live and
work nearby.
Before leaving the feminist critique it must be pointed out that
utilizing feminist methodologies to expose the distinction’s patriarchy
is vulnerable to the argument that there is no male-female dualism in
the distinction at all. It is often argued that mainstream environmentalism is itself rampant with patriarchy, suggesting that the land useenviro distinction is merely a dichotomy that separates two male sys205
tems. The history of environmental law is, to some extent, reflective
of patriarchy. President Theodore Roosevelt’s early preservation efforts, for example, isolated large areas of the outdoors for recreation
that was typically associated with masculine endeavors. Additionally,
202. Id. at 182-83.
203. Id. at 183-85. “Any new conception of human identity would need to make allowances
for the variety of human commitments to and human caring relations for the limitless variety of
beings in nature, as well as providing for alternative visions and ethical frameworks which may
be highly regionalized and particularized.” Id.
204. Id. at 189.
205. See Verchick, supra note 42, at 39-40, 62 (advancing the notion that the current environmental regulatory structure perpetuated values and policies with which white men were
more comfortable, thereby “locking out” women and racial minorities from involvement in the
structure) ; Delgado, supra note 174, at 1226; Warner, supra note 8, at 481–82.
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the current system of environmental law, with its endless list of acronyms and data-driven risk-benefit analyses, is a system that reflects
206
masculine ideals.
A male bias can also be seen in environmental
law’s separation of environmental media from personal experience, in
its objective of reducing pollution in the aggregate rather than
through the achievement of distributive justice, and in risk assessment’s reliance on data dealing with pollution’s effects on the average
white male. 207 Even some of the more creative moments in environmental law, notably the resurrection of the public trust doctrine, have
been characterized as patriarchal.208 More generally, one observer has
pointed out that the problem with mainstream environmentalism is
“that man measures what is good for the environment, and any time
man is the measure, selfishness and expediency loom large in the cal209
culation.”
These criticisms pose a fundamental, but not insurmountable
hurdle for the feminist critique. First, it must be remembered that the
theoretical underpinnings of environmental law are undeniably feminine. As noted, the philosophy of Rachel Carson included a moral
edge combined with a focus on ecological connections and respect for
210
The writings of influential ecologists such as Aldo
biodiversity.
Leopold similarly emphasized the value of nature’s diversity and the
need to make ethically sound land use decisions.211 Further, women’s
issues such as reproductive health are often addressed in environmental scholarship,212 and many of the grass-roots organizations that
213
Even
launch environmental causes are dominated by women.
206. See Verchick, supra note 42, at 39-40.
207. See id. at 66.
208. See Delgado, supra note 174, at 1221-23 (pointing to the public trust doctrine in particular, characterizing the trust as a male instrument and arguing that that the doctrine works to
the exclusion of ecofeminists and deep ecologists).
209. See Warner, supra note 8, at 481.
210. See Manus, supra note 38, at 387, 391-92.
211. See generally ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC (Oxford University Press
ed.1948). Leopold’s often quoted observation notes that “[a] thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.” Id. at 240.
212. See, e.g., Geetanjali Misra et al., Poor Reproductive Health and Environmental Degradation; Outcomes of Women’s Low Status in India, 6 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 273
(1995).
213. See Verchick, supra note 42, at 23-24; see also Barbara Epstein, Ecofeminism and
Grass-Roots Environmentalism in the United States, in INTRODUCTION TO TOXIC STRUGGLES;
THE THEORY & PRACTICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 144 (Richard Hofrichter, ed., 1993);
Tannetje Bryant & Keith Akers, Environmental Controls in Vietnam, 29 ENVTL. 133, 144 (1999)
(noting women’s group work to heighten awareness of environmental problems in Vietnam).
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though some of environmentalism’s feminist underpinnings have
214
eroded in the past decade, they have not vanished altogether.
NEPA’s focus on integrative decision-making and CERCLA’s allocation of damages for natural resource degradation are two examples
that remain intact.215 Further, the view of environmentalism endorsed
here, which would re-invigorate environmental law by returning to
and building upon concepts associated with feminism, is one that departs from the mainstream agenda.
Second, even if environmental law suffers to some extent from
male bias, it is nevertheless feminine when compared to land use law.
As mentioned, land use decisions are made predominantly by men
and for the most part deal with the development of land. The focus
on domination, order, and commerce place land use decisions clearly
on the masculine side of the spectrum. On the other hand, environmental law—despite any perceived patriarchal flaws—seeks to protect the natural environment and its biodiversity, interests that have
been and remain the concern of feminists.
Finally, although liberal feminism might argue that the land useenviro distinction presents a classic double bind that requires a radical
response, a pragmatic feminist approach would willingly search for a
216
less drastic, yet beneficial solution. Professor Margaret Radin has
shown that even though it may be necessary to rectify the subordination of women in order to get past this type of double bind, pragmatic
choices can be made in the interim.217 Pragmatic feminism refuses to
eliminate male patriarchy by holding out oppressed interests as special; rather it treats all parties involved with care and justice and recognizes that some choices are preferable even though they may not
214. See Manus, supra note 52, at 288. (citing backlashes against the Clean Water Act’s
wetlands program and the Endangered Species Act). Id. at 253-254.
215. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (A) (2000) (“[all agencies of the federal government shall] utilize a
systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated use of the natural and
social sciences and the environmental design arts in planning and in decision-making which may
have an impact on man’ s environment”); 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a)(4)(C) (2000) (“any person who
accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities,
incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be
liable for.. . . damages for injury to , destruction of, or loss of natural resources. . .”).
216. See Radin, supra note 185, at 1704 (“The pragmatist solution is to confront each dilemma separately and choose the alternative that will hinder empowerment the least and further it the most.” ). A double bind occurs when both the allowance and prohibition of certain
activities by the law would harm women. Id. at 1699-1700.
217. See id. at 1699-1700 (“We must look carefully at the non-ideal circumstances in each
case and decide which horn of the dilemma is better (or less bad), and we must keep re-deciding
as time goes on.”).
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be ideal from a radical feminist perspective.218 The patriarchy that
shadows both sides of the land use-enviro distinction is thus not an
impediment to the feminist critique; rather it can be adequately addressed by a realistic and pragmatic response.
V. GEOGRAPHY
The geographic critique of the land use-enviro distinction focuses
on its abstractions, specifically its failure to be tied to space and place.
Unlike feminism, geography’s challenge is not based on oppression;
rather, it targets the abstraction inherent in the current legal approach. Like feminism, however, a geographic critique suggests that
the distinction should be replaced by a legal framework that is more
closely tied to place and ecosystem health.
The perspectives of place, space and scale are key to geographers, who rely on various epistemologies, including positivism, real219
Regardism, iterative approaches, feminism and postmodernism.
less of approach, geography focuses on spatial representation in
various manifestations while seeking to synthesize human activity and
the physical environment. 220 The phenomena that give places character are of interest to geography as are interdependencies between
places.221
Applied geography has been helpful in the resolution of land use
and environmental issues such as siting determinations and stream
222
restoration projects. In applications like these, geographers are able
to examine context and connections,223 manage data, and provide
technology and unique perspectives. Their services enable decisionmakers to focus on relevant “connections in complex systems and the
224
importance of locations and arrangements.”
Geography theory is also beginning to have an impact on other
academic disciplines. For example, geographic critique is becoming
more commonplace in the law. It is a foundation of critical space
218. Id. at 1718.
219. REDISCOVERING GEOGRAPHY: NEW RELEVANCE FOR SCIENCE AND SOCIETY 28–29
(National Academy Press 1997) (explaining the variety of epistemologies employed in geographic inquiry).
220. Id. at 44-45 (noting the merits of different epistemologies in synthesizing human activity).
221. Id. at 30, 91-92.
222. See id. at 109, 111 (explaining the impact of geographic data on urban policy and resource management).
223. Id. at 145.
224. Id. at 135, 162.
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theory, which questions the law’s indeterminacy and uncertain
225
It is also apparent in the increasing amount of legal
boundaries.
scholarship that calls attention to the importance of place and context.226 As used here, the term “place” combines the concepts of nature, space and environment with personal experience. It is a word
that “combines the meaning we associate with nature and the utility
we associate with the environment. It fosters respect for our surroundings that arises from harmony, partnership, and intimacy.”227 It
is a personal and deeply felt concept that combines feeling with locale.
As has been made clear, the concepts of context and place are
not unique to geography. They are shared by feminism and pragma228
and are reflected in the place-based perspective of environtism,
mental ethics.229 Environmental ethicists believe that once an area is
accepted as a place, moral and cultural obligations arise, fostering a
230
sense of community. Ecofeminist ethicists would agree; their virtueethics and ideal of the ecological self involve similar commitments to
particular places and inhabitants.231

225. See generally Robert R. M. Verchick, Critical Space Theory: Keeping Local Geography
in American and European Environmental Law, 73 TUL. L. REV. 739 (1999).
226. A brief Westlaw search retrieved a large number of articles focused on place. Among
them were Holly Doremus, The Special Importance of Ordinary Places, 23 SPG ENVIRONS
ENVTL. L & POL’Y J. 3 (2000) (arguing for the more general environmental protection of land
and resources); Dune Lankard, Sacred Places; Indian Rights After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 10
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 371 (1999) (observing the particular importance of land to a tribal
group); Wendy Lee Anderson, Anne Cottrell & Rebecca Fisher, Lost Landscapes and Failed
Economies: The Search for a Value of Place by Thomas Michael Power, 24 ECOL. L.Q. 377
(Book Review 1997) (examining the economic impact and value of the environment as place);
John Nivala, Saving the Spirit of Our Places: A View on Our Built Environment 15 UCLA J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1 (1996-97) (noting the peculiar environmental interests of buildings and
structures); and Mark Sagoff, supra note 98. See also Nancy Perkins Spyke, Charm in the City:
Thoughts on Urban Ecosystem Management, 16 FLA. ST. U. J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 153
(2001) (arguing for a place-based approach to urban ecosystem management).
227. Sagoff, supra note 98, at 389.
228. See Radin, supra note 185, at 1707.
229. See generally Abdoney, supra note 190; see also Sagoff, supra note 98, at 388, 392-93.
Environmental ethicists reject the idea that man is the measure of all things. See Warner, supra
note 8, at 481.
230. See Sagoff, supra note 98, at 388 (applying Hannah Arendt’s philosophy to environmentalism).
231. See Plumwood, supra note 157, at 186 (“[Ecological selfhood]. . . must be seen rather as
an attempt to obtain a new human and a new social identity in relation to nature which challenges this dominant instrumental conception, and its associated social relations.”); see also
Dorothy Dinnerstein, Survival on Earth: The Meaning of Feminism, and Helen Forsey, Community—Meeting our Deepest Needs, in HEALING THE WOUNDS, supra note 138, at 194, 231
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Place-based thinking has been offered as a more generalized fix
for land use and property law. In this regard, it has been suggested
that concern for community expectations and place can lead to more
232
mature property and land use laws. This type of contextualization
would represent a significant departure from the traditional dualistic
approach, which analyzes land use decisions through individual
autonomy and which may exclude environmental concerns. However, geography can help achieve a new focus by making place and
community more common factors in land use and environmental decision-making.233
Compartmentalized and dualistic thinking has come under increasing fire as the absurdity of separating humans from environment
234
and nature from culture has been exposed. Yet the disconnect between humans and place has been evident throughout much of
American history. From the colonial era into the early twentieth century, nature was seen as something to be conquered. Even today, industry operates for the most part without any linkage between production and place.235
In the legal realm, negation of place is illustrated by the law’s reliance on abstract rules to address distinct environmental issues. One
example is the use of trust law to address the degradation of public
236
environmental amenities. It has also been argued that the law governing local waste flow regulation ignores geographic space,237 and
that the law is becoming less sensitive to the environmental values of

(“The core meaning of feminism, I am saying, lies, at this point, in its relation to earthly life’s
survival.”).
232. See Freyfogle, supra note 7, at 582, 590. Community is often tied to locale or “situatedness” and is thus closely related to place. See Poirier, supra note 6, at 48.
233. See REDISCOVERING GEOGRAPHY, supra note 219, at 30 (noting that geographers
must consider flows of people and materials, in addition to the physical characteristics of place
and the interrelationships between places).
234. See e.g., Abdoney, supra note 190, at 1232; Sagoff, supra note 98, at 356-58, 411-16.
235. See Sagoff, supra note 98, at 368 (noting that many common industries, from insurance
to education to technology, are not related to any natural resources or natural advantage).
236. See Delgado, supra note 174, at 1214-15. (arguing that the public trust doctrine is essentially conservative, both unable to provide a satisfactory mechanism for experimenting with
more innovative approaches to environmental problems, and out of step with more contemporary understandings of environmental conservation).
237. See Verchick, supra note 225, at 754-56. Professor Verchick notes the Supreme
Courts’ invocation of the dormant commerce clause to strike down locally oriented wastedisposal or flow-control ordinances, but points out that locality has been an important consideration in issues of standing. Id. at 770-74.
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native Americans.238 In other areas of environmental regulation, laws
target threats to water, air, and wilderness without integrating per239
sonal experience and locale, leading to pronouncements that Congress is oblivious to the importance of place.240
Both land use and environmental regulation are thus susceptible
to the argument that they have ignored geography. Property law has
come under similar attack, despite the increasingly loud voice of
241
property rights activists who oppose laws altering the status quo.
The property rights movement endorses the idea that more stronglydefined property rights are needed to address the institutional failures
242
that are at the root of environmental problems. Supporters argue
that the injection of environmental protection measures into land use
laws makes planning more complex and property rights less certain,
243
subjecting landowners to the whim of local planners. Interestingly,
their primary targets are ecosystem-based regulations, 244 the very local and place-based laws that geography would endorse.
Yet others would argue that property law must respond to envi245
ronmental concerns by developing a stronger sensitivity for place.
A new property regime would reinforce the idea that property law
functions to serve not only individual values, but also community interests.246 It would seek to translate community expectations into
property ownership norms, contextualizing them within the place that
238. See Manus, supra note 52, at 261-66 (noting the trend, especially since the 1980s, of the
Supreme Court to limit tribal sovereignty in the context of land regulation).
239. See Verchick, supra note 42, at 46 (noting that grassroots organizations typically view
traditionally non-environmental problems, from lead paint to workplace chemical exposures to
street crime, as “environmental”).
240. See REDISCOVERING GEOGRAPHY, supra note 219, at 120.
241. See Cutting, supra note 16, at 834.
242. See GOVERNMENT VS. ENVIRONMENT ix – x (Donald R. Leal & Robert E. Meiners ed.
2002).
243. See Morriss & Meiners, supra note 19, at 96, 122-36 (arguing for a greater protection of
private property by way of the common law, which they view as flexible and protective of individual autonomy, as opposed to centralized planning measures).
244. See Michael Greve, Debate: Faction and the Environment, 21 ECOL. L. Q. 528, 528-29,
532 (1994) ( arguing that the law’s acceptance of ecological protection would compromise private property interests by mandating broad-based public participation, deference to goaloriented statutory language and regulatory takings, and liberal standing, but concluding that
recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has retreated from the “ecological, statist paradigm”).
245. See, e.g., Sax, supra note 27, at 1451-53 (arguing for ecosystem awareness in takings
disputes); Cutting, supra note 16, at 831, 851 (suggesting a cubist model that would deal with
environmental externalities at the place where they occur).
246. See Freyfogle, supra note 7, at 579 (arguing that private property exists to serve communal needs, and that the community is often well served by recognizing strong individual
property rights – to the extent that these rights are in accord with community wishes).
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is the community.247 Such a system would season traditional property
doctrine with an increased ecological understanding; it would deemphasize individual dominion and control over property, favor increased public participation, and reflect ecosystem-wide and placebased interests.248
The geographic critique of land use, environmental, and property
law exposes the folly of maintaining the land use-enviro distinction.
Geography’s emphasis on place attacks the distinction’s abstraction at
its core by arguing for a more grounded analysis. Once place is incorporated into land use planning and environmental decisionmaking, the differences between the two will be obscured. Under
such a framework, both activities would address how particular land
can be used. Any decision about what can be done with the land
would necessarily take into account ecological and community concerns. Like feminism, geography raises valid questions about the land
use-enviro distinction and suggests the need for a unified approach.
Getting decision-makers to accept the idea that geography is not
merely descriptive but is of analytical and technical worth will be a
249
Getting them to actually use geography’s concept of
challenge.
place in land use, environmental, and property regulation will be even
more difficult. Yet there are a number of ways the transition can begin. Ecosystem and regional planning are already more feasible due
to advances in technology.250 Geographic Imaging Systems (GIS)
technology allows computers to assemble, store, manipulate and display geographic data, making it particularly useful in monitoring
251
natural resources and showing trends over time. Additionally, geographers can do more to help decision-makers by conducting research
on nonlinear dynamics, analyzing the relationship between physical
252
and human geography, and undertaking multi-disciplinary projects.
Courts, too, need to consider the importance of local geography
when appropriate. Lawyers can strive to make judges more geographically astute by focusing attention on ecosystems and by ensur247. Id. at 582.
248. See Sax, supra note 27, at 1451, 1455 (noting the Supreme Court’s recognition of an
ecological perspective on property rights, and its rejection of that view in favor of an “outdated
view of property”).
249. See REDISCOVERING GEOGRAPHY, supra note 219, at 139.
250. See Daly, supra note 35, at 37-38.
251. See REDISCOVERING GEOGRAPHY, supra note 219, at 58,-63 (detailing actual or potential uses of GIS technology, including identifying of disease clusters, planning infrastructure improvements, and reapportioning political districts).
252. See id. at 168 (recommending context-driven, “cross-cutting” projects).
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ing that the voices of those who are concerned with place are heard.253
When appropriate, courts should be deferential to the positions of
decision-makers at the levels closest to the place at issue.254 Litigation
alternatives should also be explored and, when possible, judges
should encourage site-specific negotiation as a way to inject geo255
graphic and community interests into decision-making. In short, the
abstract market ideology should be tempered by a geographic sensitivity, and opportunities for public participation should be taken ad256
vantage of at the local level. Only in this way will place assume importance in the judicial decision-making process.257
VI. GEO-FEMINISM
Both feminism and geography call into question the land useenviro distinction, but they do so in different ways. Feminism challenges the distinction’s domination and isolation of nature, while geography points to its failure to take into account community and
place. These seemingly divergent viewpoints can be harmonized into
a geo-feminist critique that offers a more expansive response.
The geographic tradition has been challenged by feminists who
258
Geograargue that it, too, is steeped in patriarchy and dualism.
phers take pride in their detachment and transcendent vision and
259
strive for objectivity and universality. To feminists this leaves little
room for specificity in geography; its language is “transparent, characterless, neutral . . . .”260 Nevertheless, objectivity continues to dominate geography, reinforcing dualism and rendering other perspectives
meaningless.261 The discipline is thus plagued with patriarchy, even
262
though its bias may be unintentional.

253. See Verchick, supra note 225, at 774.
254. See Freyfogle, supra note 65, at 477, 495–97 (discussing preemption of nonfederal environmental laws and regulations).
255. See Poirier, supra note 6, at 71 (arguing that focused conflict resolution is more likely to
promote the community interest).
256. See Verchick, supra note 225, at 786.
257. See Freyfogle, supra note 65, at 506-07 (arguing that state and local governments should
be given a larger role in environmental regulation).
258. See Gillian Rose, FEMINISM & GEOGRAPHY: THE LIMITS OF GEOGRAPHICAL
KNOWLEDGE 3–4 (1993).
259. Id. at 7.
260. Id. at 8.
261. Id. at 9. Geography views public space as male and private space as female and further
reinforces dualism in its separation of work and home. Id. at 18, 120.
262. See id. at 10.
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Feminist geographers believe that the nature of women’s experiences creates a social reality and subjectivity that differs from that of
263
men. They argue that geography’s concept of space is the result of a
masculine bias and that different kinds of space can be revealed
264
They point out that geographic fieldthrough diverse identities.
work is traditionally seen as a heroic, masculine endeavor, 265 and that
geographers routinely use feminine pronouns to refer to cities.266
Various schools within the discipline, notably time geography and
humanist geography, arguably suffer from a male bias that stems from
their failure to accurately perceive or represent other viewpoints.267
Thus “[c]oncepts of place and space are implicitly gendered in geographical discourse.”268
Feminist geography, which attempts to address the problems of
this masculine tradition, is an “ambivalent discourse straddling both
the need to represent women and the need to speak of differences
269
among women.” The landscape it envisions does not reflect a “male
270
gaze,” but instead produces a “locus of relationships.”271 The
emerging feminist geography offers a sense of space that is “multidimensional, shifting, and contingent.” It seeks both what is represented and what is missing,272 recognizing a complex space that is both
multi-dimensional and paradoxical, oscillating between the center and
margin.273
A geo-feminist perspective merges the principal arguments of the
feminist and geographic critiques. It stresses the importance of
seeking out the voices of the excluded and oppressed while at the
same time focusing on place. The place that emerges is a complex
and changing one, rather than one restricted by traditional masculine
viewpoints. Geo-feminism would fault the land use-enviro distinction

263. Id. at 26.
264. Id. at 37–38. Geography’s “[t]ransparent space . . . denies the possibility of different
spaces being known by other subjects.” Id. at 40.
265. Id. at 70.
266. Id. at 69.
267. Id. at 44–45, 88. Professor Rose states that time geography focuses on “social-scientific
masculinity” and thus represses the feminized other, while humanist geography acknowledges
the Other but sees it through “masculinist notions of Woman.” Id. at 44–45.
268. Id. at 62.
269. Id. at 116.
270. Id. at 99.
271. Id. at 112.
272. Id. at 140.
273. Id. at 152-54.
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for being abstract and divorced from place. It would mold a new conception of place as one of “plurilocality,” which demands an imagina274
tive and open search for local identity. Decisions on how land is to
be used would be tied to distinct places identified through environmental, social and economic interests. There would be no distinction
between land use and environmental issues; rather, all relevant parameters would be addressed in decisions regarding the land and all
voices would be heard.
VII. PROPOSALS AND CONCLUSION
The dualism and abstraction inherent in the status quo can be
eradicated only by adjusting decision-making at all levels. An increased reliance on the principles of sustainable development and
ecosystem planning is crucial. Broad-based public participation and
citizen educational outreach must also play a role. Interdisciplinary,
holistic approaches that welcome input from geographers, sociologists, economists and environmentalists will be required.
These techniques cannot merely be layered onto the entrenched
system as window dressing for the status quo. Rather, erasing the
land use-enviro distinction will require a philosophical shift. No
longer can humans be thought of as divorced from their surroundings.
No longer can there be a universal, patriarchal view of what it means
to be living in a space. No longer can there be a refusal to relinquish,
or at least share, some of the sticks in the sacrosanct bundle of prop275
erty rights.
An ethical shift will also be required. One way this could be accomplished would be to encourage the consideration of ecofemi276
nism’s of ecological self and virtue ethics; another would be to make
277
land health the underpinning of all decisions affecting land use. Re278
turning to the philosophy of Rachel Carson, or building on the conception of place as oscillating and paradoxical279 are two other options. The point is not that there is only one ethical direction in which

274. Id. at 151.
275. See, e.g., Robert J. Goldstein, Green Wood in the Bundle of Sticks; Fitting Environmental Ethics and Ecology into Real Property Law, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 347 (1998).
276. See supra text accompanying notes 198-202.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 122-24.
278. See supra text accompanying note 39.
279. See supra text accompanying notes 272-73.
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to move, but that several options exist that offer practical alterna280
tives.
Local, state and federal planners can begin to implement contextualized sustainable planning by revising their decision-making procedures to accommodate diverse interests and focus on place. But
how would the proposed vision impact the courts, particularly in cases
dealing with the issues visited earlier in this article? Assuming that an
ecological awareness and respect for place is encouraged in the judiciary, preemption cases would be guided by the principle that land
use decisions must be determined holistically, with a respect for the
place and the people that are being impacted. Traditional land use
and environmental concerns would be relevant, but so would social
factors. Rather than resting decisions solely on stale and abstract
statutory analysis, courts would seek a resolution that best allows all
concerns to become part of the decision. Competing federal and state
laws would be read together with a goal of achieving integrated sustainable planning. A determination of federal preemption would be
the exception; instead, a sustainable solution coordinated between all
governmental and private stakeholders would become the norm.
With respect to Chevron applications, courts would not automatically refuse to defer to agency interpretation of environmental
statutes simply because of threatened encroachment on state land use
powers. Instead, agency land use determinations would be recognized as intertwined with and inseparable from environmental policy
decisions. Courts would be more willing to balance interests and defer to agency expertise. Similarly, when sovereign immunity questions arise, courts would be receptive to statutory interpretations that
reflect the reality that land use and environmental objectives are inseparable.
The “zone of interests” standing test under the APA could likewise be approached with the understanding that any law addressing
land use affects local environmental, social, and economic interests.
Such a liberal understanding of the zone of interests requirement
would allow more relevant voices to be heard, facilitating the eradication of the land use-enviro distinction. Similarly, parties would be
allowed to intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 as
long as their interests, which might not otherwise be given voice, represent any of the issues falling within the integrated model endorsed
here.

280. See supra text accompanying notes 216-17.
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The impact on regulatory takings cases would undoubtedly be
the most substantial. The background principles of property law that
authorize land use regulation should be seen as flexible enough to
further the goals of the community and the surrounding ecosystem as
well as private ownership and development. Instead of a bright line
test tied to pre-existing nuisance limitations and the traditional idea
of land use controls, courts should engage in a more contextualized
balancing of environmental, social, and economic needs.
As shown earlier, there are a number of current initiatives that
have begun to challenge the land use-enviro distinction. The suggestions mentioned here would take a further, if more difficult step to
end the dualism and abstraction embodied in the distinction. In this
next phase ecological, social, and economic goals would be deemed
crucial to each land use decision, and all decision-makers would adjust their legal methodology accordingly. The new integrated paradigm would embrace place-based, ecological ethics, and would rely on
input from all stakeholders.
The value of the geo-feminist critique is two-fold. It negates any
distinction between land use and environmental decisions and thus
lends support to existing initiatives that blur the distinction. More
importantly, and borrowing Mick Smith’s words from this article’s
outset, it offers an “other world” that can enrich those measures and
inspire new initiatives in the pursuit of integrated and contextualized
land use decision-making.

